Thinking “Outside the Box”: Unconstrained Creative Generation in Adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder by White, Holly A.
H O L L Y A . W H I T E
Thinking “Outside the Box”: Unconstrained Creative
Generation in Adults with Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder
Creative generation is structured around existing knowledge and task examples, yet overreliance on
specific examples may limit imagination (Ward, T. B., Finke, R. A., & Smith, S. M., 1995). The constraining
influence of knowledge during creative generation may be offset by conceptual expansion, a process of
thinking outside traditional conceptual boundaries, which may be heightened by distractibility and mild
executive dysfunction (Abraham, A., Windmann, S., Daum, I., & G€unt€urk€un, O., 2005). The present study
explored the constraining effects of knowledge in adults with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), a disorder characterized by impaired attention and inhibitory control (Barkley, R. A., 1997). Col-
lege students with and without ADHD were compared on two creative generation measures: an alien fruit
invention task that required participants to imagine fruit that might exist on another planet (Ward, T.B.,
1994), and a product label invention task wherein the goal was to invent product names without using ele-
ments of task examples (Kray, L.J., Galinski, A.D. & Wong, E.M., 2006). ADHD participants created alien
fruit that diverged more from Earth fruit and labels that conformed less to examples, relative to non-ADHD
peers. Results suggest that adults with ADHD may be less constrained by knowledge during creative genera-
tion. Findings are discussed in terms of theoretical import and practical implications for individuals with
ADHD.
Keywords: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, conformity, creative generation, structured imagination,
conceptual expansion, adults, chaotic cognition.
A motto among creative designers, “Never start at square one if you can start at square two,” refers to
the wisdom of using old models to inspire new creations (Goldschmidt, 2011). This philosophy may be
applied to creative endeavors in general; whether elements of previous ideas or designs are deliberately re-
used or just serve as inspiration, no creation is entirely new (Ward, Finke & Smith, 1995). Indeed, the appli-
cation of old patterns to new designs, or the transfer of familiar structures to invention in unfamiliar
domains, is illustrative of the role of analogical reasoning in creative endeavors (Casakin & Goldschmidt,
2000; Ward, 2004). The guiding influence of knowledge on creative generation, or “structured imagination”
(Finke, Ward & Smith, 1992), is both efficient and practical. Yet, knowledge may also limit creativity—
thinking may get stuck or fixated on a particular idea (Finke et al., 1992). A real-world example is design
fixation, wherein the creative process is stunted by interference from a specific example or perspective
(Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005). In problem solving, prior exposure to old solutions may lead engineers to
“fixate” on the previous solutions and reuse them in ways that are less effective (Jansson & Smith, 1991).
Experimental manipulations may reduce fixation and the constraining effects of knowledge during creative
generation, however (Agogue et al., 2014; Chrysikou & Weisberg, 2005; Marsh, Landau & Hicks, 1996;
Ward, Patterson & Sifonis, 2004). Individuals also differ in the extent to which their imagination is struc-
tured (and thus constrained) by prior knowledge during creative generation (Abraham, Windmann,
McKenna & G€unt€urk€un, 2007; Ward, Saunders & Dodds, 1999). In particular, individuals with an overinclu-
sive or chaotic cognitive style (Eysenck, 1993; Finke, 1996) may be less influenced by task examples or prior
knowledge during creative generation (Abraham, Windmann, Daum & G€unt€urk€un, 2005; Abraham et al.,
2007). The present study investigated structured imagination and creative generation in one such group of
individuals: college students with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The sections to follow
provide a framework for this objective from a creative cognition perspective (Ward et al., 1995).
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STRUCTURED IMAGINATION AND CONFORMITY IN CREATIVE GENERATION
Creative generation is guided by, and structured around, knowledge (Finke et al., 1992). In the labora-
tory, structured imagination is observable using the alien invention task (Ward, 1994). The goal of this task
is to create a variant of known category (e.g., animal or fruit), which might exist on another planet. Typi-
cally, participants first think of a known Earth-example of the category, which they then modify in various
ways (Ward, 1994). Creative generation tends to start with the most accessible information (Finke et al.,
1992). For instance, in the alien fruit task, participants are likely to draw inspiration from high frequency,
typical of Earth fruits, such as apple or orange, which are easily retrieved from memory (Ward & Wickes,
2009).Thus, creative generation follows a path of least resistance by default (Finke et al., 1992). The struc-
turing influence of examples is often apparent in the resemblance between the creative product and its inspi-
ration. Thus, alien fruit creations are likely to be juicy, sweet, and have seeds and a stem, because these
features are typical of Earth fruit (Ward, Patterson, Sifonis, Dodds & Saunders, 2002). Similarly, an alien
creature inspired by an Earth animal is likely to show typical animal characteristics, such as bilateral
symmetry (Ward, 1994).
In the absence of contextual information or task constraints, participants draw upon specific examples
from memory during the alien creature invention task (Ward, 1994). In doing so, participants are likely to
include more features typical of Earth animals. Yet, creations based on specific examples are less likely to
include atypical features or attributes, and thus are lower in novelty (Kray, Galinsky & Wong, 2006; Ward,
1994). Likewise, alien fruits that are inspired by specific Earth fruits are judged as less original (Ward et al.,
2002). These studies demonstrate that when imagination is guided by knowledge, it may be constrained by
that knowledge as well (Ward et al., 2002). Yet, experimental manipulations of structured imagination tasks
may impact participants’ reliance on specific examples during creative generation (Ward, 1994; Ward et al.,
2004). By altering the constraints of the alien creature invention task, Ward (1994) directed participants
toward either (a) retrieval of specific Earth animal exemplars, or (b) use of broader knowledge structures.
Participants in the second condition were less likely to base creatures on specific Earth animals, and more
likely to include novel (atypical) features in their invented creatures (Ward, 1994). Novelty is also higher
when participants are instructed to use their wildest imaginations (Ward, 1994) or to consider factors that
might impact survival on another planet (Ward et al., 2004). In the alien fruit invention task, reliance on
specific Earth fruit exemplars is lower for participants instructed to not be bound by what fruit is like on
Earth, compared to participants instructed to simply be creative (Ward et al., 2002). Thus, while creative
generation tends to follows a path of least resistance by default, the creative approach is flexible and may
change in response to task demands (Ward, 1994).
Creative generation is also influenced by recently activated knowledge in the form of task examples
(Smith, Ward & Schumacher, 1993). Smith et al. (1993) showed participants three example toys prior to a
toy invention task. Each of these toys included three critical features: a ball, an electronic device, and a high
level of physical activity. The effect of the examples was striking—despite explicit instructions to create toys
that were very different from examples, the majority of participants included the shared attributes of the
task examples in their toy designs (Smith et al., 1993). This tendency to retain features of examples in cre-
ative products, dubbed the “conformity effect” (Smith et al., 1993) is a robust phenomenon that has been
observed in multiple contexts, using various experimental stimuli (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Kray et al., 2006;
Marsh, Ward & Landau, 1999). Marsh et al. (1999) replicated the conformity effect using verbal materials,
rather than visual. The product label invention task required participants to create labels for new products
in each of three categories. In one condition, Marsh et al. (1999) provided task examples for each category
which shared a common ending (e.g., pasta labels that ended in the letters “ni”—rotini, tortellini, rigatoni)
and instructed participants not to copy the examples. Nonetheless, participants exposed to task examples
were more likely to include example endings in the labels they created (Marsh et al., 1999).
Like schemas and self-generated examples, task examples may limit creative generation, as evidenced by
lower novelty and originality of designs (Finke et al., 1992; Kray et al., 2006). Nonetheless, conformity per se
does not necessarily imply that the creative process has been compromised or that the end product will be
suboptimal (Marsh et al., 1996). In a study by Marsh et al. (1996), participants were exposed to various
types of task examples prior to completing the alien creature invention task. As predicted by the conformity
hypothesis, participants’ designs included critical features of the examples, yet conformity had no effect on
creative output, elaboration, or the inclusion of novel design features (Marsh et al., 1996). In fact, partici-
pants shown “artificial” examples (e.g., animals that possessed unusual feature pairings, such as claws and
antennae) invented alien creatures that were rated as more creative, relative to inventions in the standard
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example and control conditions (Marsh et al., 1996). Notably, Marsh et al.’s (1996) artificial examples were
highly original, which likely inspired relatively creative designs. Similar findings have emerged in problem
solving studies; viewing unusual solutions prior a problem-solving task increases the originality of solutions
(Agogue et al., 2014; Perttula & Sipil€a, 2007).
In an effort to explain the basis of the fixating versus inspiring ability of task examples, Agogue et al.
(2014) crafted example solutions that exposed participants to either new or redundant information prior to
problem solving. “Restrictive” examples were solutions expected to be spontaneously activated during prob-
lem solving, and therefore likely to reinforce the solver’s conceptual problem space; “expansive” examples
were solutions not expected to occur to the solver, and thus likely to widen the problem space. Agogue et al.
(2014) observed that restrictive examples reduced the originality of participants’ solutions, while expansive
examples increased originality. On the basis of these findings, Agogue et al. (2014) concluded that the influ-
ence of a task example was determined by its effect on the solver’s conceptual problem space; examples that
widened the problem space increased originality, whereas examples that restricted or narrowed the problem
space led to fixation (Agogue et al., 2014).
Studies that have varied parameters of creative generation and problem-solving tasks yield valuable infor-
mation about conditions under which knowledge is more (or less) likely to constrain creativity. In the con-
text of recently activated knowledge, unoriginal task examples are more likely to lead to fixation, and
unusual task examples promote originality (Agogue et al., 2014; Marsh et al., 1996; Perttula & Sipil€a, 2007).
Another way to reduce fixation is to interrupt the processes involved in structured imagination; this may be
accomplished by adding an additional constraint, thereby blocking the path of least resistance (Landau &
Leynes, 2004). Youmans (2011) asked participants to complete a secondary task while viewing potentially
fixating information; in this case, participants were too distracted to be influenced by the example in the
first place. In a structured imagination task, such as the alien creature invention task, examples are retrieved
from memory and creative generation is guided by participants’ schemas (Ward, 1994). Reliance on self-gen-
erated examples can nonetheless be reduced, by encouraging an abstract approach (Ward, 1994) or varying
instructions or task constraints in such a way that reliance on easily accessible or high frequency informa-
tion is not a viable option (Ward, 1994; Ward et al., 2004). Collectively, these studies suggest that the con-
straining influence of knowledge during creative generation may be reduced by: (a) increasing conceptual
expansion, and/or (b) disrupting the default path of least resistance or distracting from relevant information.
As it happens, individual differences in cognitive processing may affect creative generation in much the same
way (Finke, 1996).
CHAOTIC, DIVERGENT PROCESSES IN CREATIVE GENERATION: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
The tendency to rely on knowledge during creative cognition may be universal, yet individuals differ in
the degree to which they are constrained by knowledge during creative generation. Finke and Bettle (1996)
describe two contrasting styles—ordered and chaotic—which are likely to impact structured imagination in
opposite ways. Ordered cognition is linear, organized, and goal-directed (Finke & Bettle, 1996). In the con-
text of creative generation, ordered thinkers demonstrate a high degree of structure and connectedness to
previous ideas and models (Finke, 1996). In contrast, the disorganized, spontaneous, and relatively unstruc-
tured style of chaotic cognition is likely to foster imaginative divergence, rather than structural connected-
ness (Finke, 1996; Finke & Bettle, 1996). In many ways, chaotic cognition resembles the overinclusive
processing style described by Eysenck (1993). According to Eysenck (1993), individuals differ in scope of
perceived conceptual relevance, and people who define relevance more widely have an overinclusive process-
ing style. In Eysenck’s (1993) model, inclusiveness of processing is a key aspect of creative ideation. By vir-
tue of broadly focused attention and conceptual activation, overinclusive thinkers are able to bring multiple
ideas into close proximity, which facilitates original creative thinking (Eysenck, 1993). Eysenck (1993) pre-
dicted an overlap between the overinclusive processing style, trait psychoticism, and originality in divergent
thinking, which was confirmed in later research (Acar & Runco, 2012; Eysenck, 1994). In the context of cre-
ative generation, people with an overinclusive processing style may engage in relatively high conceptual
expansion, a process whereby traditional conceptual boundaries are extended (Ward, 1994). Abraham et al.
(2005) tested this hypothesis by comparing individuals with high trait psychoticism (high—P) and individu-
als with low trait psychoticism (low—P) on the alien creature invention task. As predicted, high-P individu-
als showed higher conceptual expansion on this task, as evidenced by the invention of alien creations that
deviated more from Earth animals (e.g., lacked bilateral symmetry) compared to the creatures invented by
low-P participants. Abraham et al. (2005) argued that the higher conceptual expansion in the high-P group
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was attributable to low latent inhibitory control and weaker top-down knowledge constraints. Abraham
et al.’s (2005) findings suggest that the overinclusive, chaotic thinking associated with trait psychoticism
may be beneficial for conceptual expansion during creative generation.
Chaotic cognition may likewise increase the ability to overcome the constraining effects of recently acti-
vated knowledge during creative generation (Abraham & Windmann, 2008; Abraham et al., 2007; Eysenck,
1993; Finke & Bettle, 1996).The information provided by task examples during creative generation is highly
relevant and therefore not easily ignored (Abraham et al. (2007). Under these circumstances, attentional
fluctuations and distractibility may give chaotic thinkers an edge (Eysenck, 1993; Finke & Bettle, 1996).
Studies of creative generation have found lower conformity to task examples among individuals with trait
schizotypy (Abraham et al., 2007), patients with schizophrenia (Abraham & Windmann, 2008), and children
with ADHD (Abraham, Windmann, Siefen, Daum & G€unt€urk€un, 2006). Distractible individuals, such as
children with ADHD, may be able to disregard salient knowledge by virtue of spontaneous activity in the
default mode network (DMN), a group of structures deactivated during goal-directed activity (Beaty, Bene-
dek, Silvia & Schacter, 2016). Spontaneous activity in the DMN causes micro-lapses in attention which
interfere with goal-directed activity (Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007). In theory, these disruptions might
also destabilize active knowledge patterns or distract from relevant examples during creative generation
tasks, thereby reducing the constraining influence of knowledge on imagination.
CREATIVE COGNITION IN ADHD
ADHD is a neurological condition marked by distractibility, impulsivity, and hyperactivity that affects
children and adults (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). ADHD is associated with deficits in attention,
inhibitory control, and motivational regulation (Barkley, 1997; Castellanos & Aoki, 2016; Nigg, 2001;
Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007; Sonuga-Barke, Sergeant, Nigg & Willcutt, 2008). The cognitive profile of
ADHD, while detrimental to activities which require organized, linear cognition, may nonetheless be benefi-
cial for some aspects of creative cognition (Abraham et al., 2006; White & Shah, 2006, 2011, 2016). In par-
ticular, adults with ADHD may be more original and innovative during divergent thinking (White & Shah,
2006, 2016) and may show higher levels of creative achievement (White & Shah, 2011). Creative cognition
in ADHD may be partially attributable to deficits in executive inhibitory control (White & Shah, 2006). This
is consistent with the “less is more” role of prefrontal function in certain creative processes (Thompson-
Schill, Ramscar & Chrysikou, 2009). Neuroimaging studies have identified brain networks common to
ADHD pathology (Castellanos & Proal, 2012; Castellanos et al., 2008) and creative cognition (Beaty et al.,
2016). Of particular relevance to creative generation is inefficient suppression of the default mode network,
which has been linked to divergent creative thinking (Takeuchi et al., 2011) as well as ADHD (Fassbender
et al., 2009; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007).
More broadly, creative differences related to ADHD may be framed in terms of chaotic cognition (Finke
& Bettle, 1996; White & Shah, 2006). Like other chaotic thinkers, adults with ADHD are impulsive (Barkley,
1997), score high on divergent thinking measures (White & Shah, 2006, 2011), prefer the idea generation
phase of problem solving over clarification and development (White & Shah, 2011), and find unusual uses
for common, everyday objects (White & Shah, 2006). In a recent study, adults with ADHD produced
responses that were less semantically related to cues on a word association task, compared to non-ADHD
peers (White & Shah, 2016). Thus, adults with ADHD have a relatively wide scope of perceived relevance, as
operationally defined by Eysenck (1993). On a cell phone feature invention task, White and Shah (2016)
found that adults with ADHD invented features in more categories, compared to non-ADHD peers, and this
difference was statistically mediated by semantic distance of responses on the word association test. White
and Shah (2016) also found higher novelty for ADHD participants, compared to non-ADHD participants,
as evidenced by invented features that diverged more from existing technology. These findings align with
the predictions of Eysenck’s (1993) model of creativity and overinclusive processing, and are consistent with
greater imaginative divergence in adults with ADHD (White & Shah, 2016).
By logical extension, ADHD might be expected to protect against the constraining effects of schema and
self-generated examples during creative generation. Yet, Abraham et al. (2006) found no evidence of differ-
ences in conceptual expansion between adolescents with and without ADHD on the alien creature invention
task. The null finding may have been due to a floor effect, however; as all participants in Abraham et al.
(2006) scored low in conceptual expansion, relative to non-ADHD adults in another study that used the
same task and scoring protocol (Abraham et al., 2005). The measurement technique may not have been
ideal for assessing conceptual expansion; Abraham et al. (2006) used an aggregate measure that combined
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the presence of atypical features with a lack of typical features. However, studies have found ceiling effects
for inclusion of typical features (e.g., Kray et al., 2006; Ward, 1994); in fact, even creatively gifted individu-
als are likely to include central attributes in their creations (Ward et al., 1999). Conceptual expansion may
be more associated with the inclusion atypical features, rather than the exclusion of typical features.
Previous research has linked ADHD to divergent thinking (White & Shah, 2006, 2011), which is a critical
element of creative cognition (Ward et al., 1995). Yet, two aspects of creative cognition that have not been
adequately assessed in ADHD are conceptual expansion and overcoming knowledge constraints (Abraham,
2014; Abraham & Windmann, 2007). Neuroimaging research suggests that these components of creative
cognition are dissociable from one another and from divergent thinking in terms of underlying pathways in
the brain (Abraham, 2014). Overcoming knowledge constraints has been explored in the context of creative
generation for children with ADHD, and in fact ADHD is associated with lower conformity to task exam-
ples (Abraham et al., 2006). Presumably, this advantage is related to distractibility, which may stem from
DMN-interference (Abraham et al., 2006; Sonuga-Barke & Castellanos, 2007). Yet, this phenomenon has not
been examined in adults with ADHD, nor has the appropriateness of creations been evaluated in the context
of a recently activated knowledge task for individuals with ADHD (in children or adults). Presumably by
virtue of low latent inhibition and an overinclusive processing, individuals with high trait psychoticism show
greater conceptual expansion during creative generation (Abraham et al., 2005). Adults with ADHD also
have low latent inhibition (White, 2007) and an overinclusive processing style (White & Shah, 2016), and
should thus be less influenced by schemas and self-generated examples during creative generation. Abraham
et al. (2006) did not find higher conceptual expansion among children with ADHD, perhaps due to floor
effects and/or the young age of participants. Thus, the question of conceptual expansion in ADHD is yet
unresolved.
THE PRESENT STUDY
The unique neurological profile associated with ADHD may protect against the constraining effects of
knowledge during creative generation. Yet, with the exception of the study by Abraham et al. (2006), this
hypothesis remains virtually untested. The present research addressed this gap by examining the well-estab-
lished phenomena of structured imagination and conformity to task examples during creative generation in
a sample of college students with and without ADHD. To this end, participants completed two creative gen-
eration tasks. The first was the alien fruit task, which required participants to draw and describe fruit that
might exist on a planet very different from Earth (Ward et al., 1999, 2002). Participants were instructed to
be as “creative and unusual as possible,” which emphasized the creativity objective of the task (Ward et al.,
2002). To create something unlike Earth fruit, participants would be compelled to think outside the tradi-
tional boundaries associated with the category “fruit.” Evidence of this conceptual expansion is indicated by
presence of atypical features (features that are not typical of Earth fruit) in alien fruit creations (Ward et al.,
1999). The ADHD group was expected to show greater conceptual expansion, as indicated by the inclusion
of more atypical features on the structured imagination task, relative to the non-ADHD group. The cre-
ations of the ADHD were also expected to be rated as more original, relative to the non-ADHD group, con-
sistent with previous studies (White & Shah, 2006, 2011).
The second creative generation task was the product label invention task (Kray et al., 2006; Marsh et al.,
1999). This task required participants to invent labels for new products without using elements of the exam-
ples provided. On this task, overcoming knowledge constraints is indicated by lower conformity to task
examples. The ADHD group in the present study was expected to include fewer elements of the task exam-
ples compared to the non-ADHD group; indicative of lower conformity during creative generation for indi-
viduals with ADHD. In addition, the present study measured the appropriateness of the product label
inventions by rating the descriptiveness of invented labels. Past research suggests a trade-off between exclud-
ing example endings and descriptiveness ratings (Kray et al., 2006), yet White and Shah (2016) found that
adults with and without ADHD generated equally appropriate cell phone features despite the higher novelty
of features in the ADHD group. Thus, no predictions were made regarding possible group differences in
label descriptiveness for the present study.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants were undergraduate students at the University of Memphis (N = 52) enrolled in Introduc-
tory Psychology. The ADHD group (n = 26) included equal numbers of males and females, and half of the
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ADHD participants were taking stimulant medication at the time of the study. The non-ADHD group
(n = 26) was also equal in gender composition. The ADHD and non-ADHD groups were similar in age
(M = 20.4, SD = 3.09; M = 20.9, SD = 3.65; ADHD and non-ADHD groups, respectively), as well as with
respect to scores on the ACT1 (M = 22.5, SD = 3.49; M = 21.8, SD = 3.96; ADHD and non-ADHD,
respectively).
PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT PROCEDURE
For participant recruitment purposes, a preliminary questionnaire was administered to approximately
800 students enrolled in Introductory Psychology at the University of Memphis as part of a large pre-screen-
ing session in which multiple researchers were recruiting participants for various studies. The questionnaire
contained items from Barkley and Murphy’s (1998) Current Symptoms Scale, as well as questions asking
whether the individual had ever been clinically diagnosed with ADHD or any attention deficit disorder, and
if so, whether the diagnosis had been confirmed by a clinician within the past 6 months. Of the pre-screen-
ing group, 48 (~6%) reported a diagnosis of ADHD and scored above the clinical threshold of the Current
Symptoms Scale. Of the students who are qualified for the ADHD group on the basis of the initial screen-
ing, 28 agreed to participate in the study; of these potential participants, two students were excluded from
the study due to comorbid psychiatric conditions (major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder),
which yielded a final sample of 26 participants for the ADHD group.2 An equal number of participants for
the non-ADHD sample were drawn randomly from a large pool of candidates from the same subject pool,
all of whom scored below the clinical threshold on the Current Symptoms Scale and reported no personal
or family history of an attention deficit disorder, learning disability, or mood disorder. A second self-report
measure, the Conners Adult ADHD Rating Scales, Screening Version (CAARS-S-SV; Conners, Erhardt &
Sparrow, 1999), was administered during the experimental session to confirm reliability of self-reported
ADHD symptoms. Scores on the CAARS-S-SV were in the clinical range for the ADHD group, and in the
nonclinical range for the non-ADHD group.
MATERIALS
Current and Childhood ADHD Symptoms Rating Scales
The Current and Childhood ADHD Symptoms Rating Scales (Barkley & Murphy, 1998) are brief, self-
report screening questionnaires for assessment of adult ADHD. Questionnaire items reflect diagnostic crite-
ria for ADHD as per the DSM-IV. These scales have high reliability and scale validity as indicated by signifi-
cant correlations between self-report and spouse/parent ratings (Barkley & Murphy, 1998).
Conners’ Adult ADHD Rating Scale, Screening Version
The CAARS-S-SV (Conners et al., 1999) is a self-report measure of adult ADHD based on current scien-
tific understanding of ADHD symptoms in adulthood. The CAARS-S-SV measures four dimensions: Inat-
tention/Executive Function, Hyperactivity/Restlessness, Impulsivity/Emotional Lability, and Problems with
Self-Concept (Conners et al., 1999).
Alien fruit creation task
Conceptual expansion was assessed via a creative generation task adapted from previous studies (Ward
et al., 1999, 2002). Task instructions were similar to the creative condition of Ward et al. (2002); partici-
pants were told: “In this task, you will be asked to imagine, draw, and describe fruit that might exist on
another planet that is very different from Earth. Be as creative and unusual as you can, and try not to dupli-
cate fruit that exists on Earth. You will have 20 minutes to complete this activity.” Conceptual expansion
was measured using a procedure adapted from previous studies (Abraham et al., 2006; Kray et al., 2006).
Two undergraduate research assistants, blind to participant condition and not involved in data collection,
referred to the visual depiction and verbal description provided for each creation to determine the presence
of parts (seeds/pits, stems) and properties (sweet, juicy) typical of Earth fruit (Tversky & Hemenway, 1984;
Ward et al., 1999), and atypical features, defined as parts or properties that are absent or extremely rare in
1 The ACT college readiness assessment is a standardized achievement test used for college admissions in the United States. Scores
range from 1 to 36, with a national average score of 21.
2 Due to strict inclusion criteria, the final sample size (n = 26) fell short of the 28 participants per group recommended by a
power analysis via G*Power software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007), but the relative purity of the groups likely
increased the sensitivity of ADHD/non-ADHD group comparisons.
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any variety of known Earth fruit. Atypical features were clustered into the following categories: (a) unusual
appendages (e.g., hand, straw), (b) sensory organs (e.g., tongue, eyeball), (c) actions (e.g., lava shooting;
combustible), and (d) effects on consumer (e.g., X-ray vision). For scoring purposes, typicality was the sum
of typical features (0–4) and atypicality was the sum of atypical clusters (0–4). To evaluate originality, two
research assistants who were blind to condition and hypothesis judged each creation’s resemblance to Earth
fruit on a 5-point scale (lower scores indicated greater similarity to Earth fruit). Agreement between raters
was high (a = .899, p < .0001). Rater disagreements were resolved by obtaining a third rating and selecting
the median.
Product label invention task
The constraining effect of recently activated knowledge (task examples) was examined via a product label
invention task adapted from Kray et al. (2006). Participants were instructed as follows: “Imagine that you
are a consultant for an advertising agency, and you’ve been asked to create names for three new products.
Please create a name for each new product. You will see a list of examples for each category, but please do
NOT use or copy any aspects of the examples provided. You will have 10 minutes to complete this task.”
The same instructions also appeared at the top of the task sheet, which listed the three categories (pain
relievers, nuclear elements, and pasta) and for each category, six examples. Within each of the three cate-
gories, the labels shared two common endings (a letter or group of letters). For pain reliever, the examples
were: Tylenol, Anacin, Aspirin, Bufferin, Panadol, and Midol (common endings -ol, -in). Nuclear element
examples were radon, plutonium, argon, carbon, radium, and uranium (-on, -ium). Pasta label examples were
spaghetti, lasagna, fettuccini, rotini, pastina, and rigatoni (-i, -a). Conformity to examples was defined as the
presence of an example ending in the label invention for the corresponding category (e.g., an invented pasta
label ending in the letter “a”). For each participant, the conformity score was the total number of label
inventions that included an example ending. The appropriateness of label inventions was also evaluated by
two undergraduate research assistants (blind to condition), using a procedure adapted from Kray et al.
(2006). Each response was rated on a 5-point scale, according to how well it revealed the product type
(pasta, pain reliever, and nuclear element). A higher value indicated that the label was more descriptive of
product category. For instance, the responses “Pastanoodlini” and “Zigganoodles” were rated as very
descriptive of the category pasta. Intra-class correlation coefficient indicated that raters were reliable
(a = .886, p < .0001). In the event of rater disagreement, a third rater was consulted and the median value
was taken. For each participant, the descriptiveness score was the median rating across the three product
categories.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
After providing informed consent, participants completed the alien fruit creation task and the product
label task. Tasks were administered by research assistants who were blind to the condition of participants in
an order counter-balanced across subjects. After the creative generation tasks, participants completed the
CAARS-S-SV (ADHD rating scales).
RESULTS
For each creative generation task, performance of the ADHD and non-ADHD groups was compared via
independent-samples t-tests. To control the family wise error rate, Holm’s sequential Bonferroni method
was applied to interpret statistical significance (Holm, 1979). The overall alpha level was set at .05 for each
set of comparisons. For the alien fruit creation task, the variables of originality, typical features, and atypical
features were compared as a function of ADHD group. This yielded reliable differences for originality, with
the creations of the ADHD group rated as more original (M = 3.387, SD = 0.983) compared to the non-
ADHD group (M = 2.77, SD = 0.908), t(50) = 2.35, p = .023 (d = 0.645). The ADHD group also
included more atypical features (M = 1.65, SD = 0.977), relative to the non-ADHD group (M = 0.654,
SD = 0.629), t(50) = 4.39, p < .001 (d = 1.22). Typical features did not reliably differ between the ADHD
group (M = 2.46, SD = 1.27) and the non-ADHD group (M = 2.81, SD = 1.17), t(50) = 1.02, p = .311
(d = 0.287). A second set of analyses for the product label invention task revealed that the labels created by
the ADHD group included fewer task examples endings (M = 1.31, SD = 1.12), compared to the non-
ADHD group (M = 2.08, SD = 0.891), t(50) = 2.74, p = .009 (d = 0.760). The category descriptiveness of
the labels did not reliably differ between the ADHD group (M = 2.96, SD = 0.824) and the non-ADHD
group (M = 3.08, SD = 0.845), t(50) = 0.499, p = .620 (d = 0.144) (Figure 1).
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DISCUSSION
The present study tested the hypothesis that adults with ADHD would be less constrained by prior and
recently activated knowledge during creative generation, relative to non-ADHD peers. The potential effect of
prior knowledge was evaluated via the alien fruit task, wherein participants were asked to draw and describe
fruit that might exist on a planet very different from Earth (Ward et al., 2002). Participants were explicitly
instructed to be as creative and unusual as possible. This was intended to encourage conceptual expansion
(thinking beyond traditional definition of “fruit”). To the extent that participants were constrained by prior
knowledge of fruit schema, their creations were expected to include fewer atypical features and more closely
resemble Earth fruit, as indicated by lower originality. As predicted, the ADHD group created alien fruit that
was rated as more original and included more atypical features, relative to the non-ADHD group. To evalu-
ate the effect of recently activated knowledge, participants were asked to invent labels for new products in
specific categories. Examples were provided for each category, and participants were instructed to avoid
copying any aspect of the task examples. The labels created by ADHD participants included fewer endings
of task examples, compared to labels invented by non-ADHD participants; yet, the descriptiveness of labels
did not differ between groups. The lack of conformity to task examples in the ADHD group was consistent
with predictions and, together with results from the alien fruit task, supported the hypothesis that individu-
als with ADHD are less likely to be constrained by knowledge during creative generation.
The present findings are broadly consistent with previous research; adults with ADHD were more origi-
nal on the alien fruit task, consistent with findings of higher originality on divergent thinking measures for
ADHD individuals (White & Shah, 2006, 2016). The present study also found support for higher conceptual
expansion among adults with ADHD, in contrast to Abraham et al.’s (2006) finding for adolescents with
ADHD. Yet, unlike Abraham et al. (2006), the present study did not use a composite index of conceptual
expansion; previous studies suggested that atypical features are more indicative of creative performance than
typical features, given that the latter are often associated with ceiling effects (Kray et al., 2006; Ward et al.,
1999). Interestingly, the ADHD participants in the present study mirrored the performance of gifted adoles-
cents in a study by Ward et al. (1999); like the ADHD group in the present study, gifted adolescents in
FIGURE 1. Sample of alien fruits created by non-ADHD and ADHD groups. ADHD, Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder.
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Ward et al. (1999) designed alien fruits that were higher in originality and atypical features, yet similar in
typical features, relative to a comparison group. Ward et al. (1999) suggested that typical features (e.g.,
seeds) may have been viewed as required to meet task objectives. Presumably, participants in the present
study included typical features for the same reason; to indicate that the creation was indeed a fruit. This
finding is notable, because it suggests that individuals with ADHD were able to be creative while staying
within task parameters.
The creative generation tasks in the present study were intended to tap dissociable elements of creative
cognition: conceptual expansion (alien fruit task) and the ability to overcome the constraining effects of
recently activated knowledge (product label task) during creative generation (Abraham, 2014). These ele-
ments, along with divergent thinking, are critical components of creative cognition (Abraham & Windmann,
2007). The present findings are therefore an important addition to the literature describing creative cogni-
tion in adults with ADHD. More generally, there may be an advantage of chaotic, unstructured cognition in
creative generation; studies have demonstrated an increased ability to overcoming the constraining influence
of task examples in children with ADHD (Abraham et al., 2006), individuals high in trait schizotypy (Abra-
ham et al., 2007), and patients with schizophrenia (Abraham & Windmann, 2008). Moreover, this common-
ality may have shared neurological underpinning; interference from the default mode network (Sonuga-
Barke & Castellanos, 2007). Nonetheless, overinclusive thinking that overly overinclusive may not yield
viable, practical ideas (Eysenck, 1993).
The goal of “creative realism” requires a balance between the structured and chaotic elements of creative
thinking (Finke, 1996). In the present study, ADHD participants created alien fruits that met implicit and
definitional criteria for the category fruit, yet demonstrated imaginative divergence and originality. On the
product label invention task, ADHD participants created labels that conformed less to task examples, yet
were equally descriptive of product type, compared to labels invented by non-ADHD participants. More-
over, past research suggests that adults with ADHD are able to invent practical features in a realistic task of
creative generation (White & Shah, 2016). Thus, the relatively mild chaos associated with ADHD may be
divergent, but not overly so.
Of course, an idea for a product is not the same as an actual creative product (Ward, 2004). According
to the creative cognitive model, ideas represent “preinventive forms” which require transformational pro-
cesses in order to manifest as an actual finished product (Ward, 2004; Ward et al., 1995). The later stages of
the creative process are likely to require patience and delayed gratification; yet, individuals with ADHD tend
to be motivated by immediate reward (Sonuga-Barke et al., 2008). Hence, people with ADHD may be less
interested in the development or implementation of their creative ideas. In fact, research suggests that indi-
viduals with ADHD prefer the ideation (brainstorming) phase of the creative process over clarification of
the problem space or development of ideas (White & Shah, 2011). Nonetheless, idea generation is inherently
valuable; perhaps the chaotic mind of an ADHD person paired with the structured mind of an ordered thin-
ker would create synergy in the context of a joint project. Studies show that exposure to creative examples
and solutions may heighten originality in the context of creative generation and problem solving (Agogue
et al., 2014; Marsh et al., 1996; Perttula & Sipil€a, 2007). Might a person with ADHD influence the creativity
of others, perhaps by widening conceptual space or disrupting the default structured approach to creative
generation? Perhaps adults with ADHD could be creative catalysts in the workplace. While these are empiri-
cal questions, they are exciting possibilities that might be explored in future research.
LIMITATIONS
The present research has exciting potential theoretical and practical implications, but there are limita-
tions that affect the interpretation and application of these findings. Primarily, the small sample size limited
the power of this study and may have increased the risk of error. Thus, results should be viewed as prelimi-
nary. The relative purity of the present sample is both a strength and limitation of the present design; the
lack of comorbidity and relatively high functioning participants in the ADHD group may have allowed for
ADHD-related creative strengths to emerge, yet these findings may not generalize to all adults with ADHD.
Adults with comorbid psychiatric conditions, learning difficulties, or more severe executive impairment were
not represented in the current study. Moreover, the college students in the present study were relatively high
functioning and may have possessed above-average intellect; this is noteworthy, because the link between
disinhibition and originality may be positively affected by intelligence (Benedek, Franz, Heene & Neubauer,
2012). Importantly, the present findings may not apply to individuals who are more clinically impaired
(Paek, Abdulla & Cramond, 2016). Finally, the creative generation tasks included in the present study were
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relatively simple and open-ended; perhaps complex problems or constrained tasks would increase reliance
on task examples (Perttula & Sipil€a, 2007). Replication with a wider variety of measures and participants is
recommended.
CONCLUSION
The results of this study provide further evidence that ADHD may be advantageous for certain types of
creative thinking; specifically, divergent, unconstrained creative cognition. Future research might explore the
potential contribution of the chaotic ADHD mind in the workplace. Research suggests that individual cre-
ativity is more likely to manifest as organizational creativity when leadership supports a culture of innova-
tion (Stempfle, 2011), and many of the most innovation companies actively encourage “outside the box”
thinking (Basadur, Runco & Vega, 2000). By leveraging ADHD-related strengths and providing the necessary
structure and support (Gupta & Singhal, 1993), individuals and organizations alike may be able to unlock
the imaginative and innovative potential of the ADHD mind.
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